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Introduction
Enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 19961 has created
substantial upheaval across the telecommunications landscape. On
one hand, it has created broad deregulatory and market entry opportunities by superseding laws, court decisions, consent decrees and
regulations that have foreclosed or conditioned facilities-based or resale competition. On the other hand, the legislation has operated under the presumption that incumbent carriers will cooperate with market entrants thereby accelerating the loss of market share, but gaining
new market entry opportunities after competition has flourished. 2
The legislation has also revalidated the concept of common carriage as the primary model for classifying telecommunications carriers. However, by doing this, Congress created another paradox. It
provided greater specificity on the duties this status entails,3 but Congress also created a mechanism for the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to abandon almost all traditional common carrier
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-173 (1996)) [hereinafter the 1996 Act].
2. A Bell Operating Company (BOC) may provide inter-LATA, "long distance"
telephone services in areas where it also provides local exchange services (commonly referred to as "in-region inter-LATA service") if: 1) it has entered into one or more binding
interconnection agreements approved by the state public utility commission having jurisdiction; or 2) in the absence of such a request it has filed a statement of generally available
terms and conditions approved by the appropriate state commission. 47 U.S.C. §§
271(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1996). LATAs are local access and transport areas, a contiguous geographical area within which a BOC may provide local and toll calling. 47 U.S.C. § 153(25)
(1996). LATAs were created as part of the AT&T Consent Decree with an eye toward
safeguarding long distance telephone service competition while also providing the divested
BOCs with a sufficiently broad geographical area to ensure ample BOC toll calling revenues and at least one carrier providing ubiquitous service. Limiting the BOCs to intraLATA service emphasized the expectation that they would exclusively provide local exchange services. See United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The BOCs have resented this line of business restriction that forecloses access to in-region domestic and international interexchange service. In 1996 the total domestic interexchange service market
constituted $93.28 billion of which the BOCs generated only $7.95 billion. Federal Communications Commission, Preliminary Statistics of Communications Common Carriers,
Table 1.4 Total Toll Service Revenues (last modified Jan. 13, 1996) at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/socc.html>.
In
1995, U.S. carriers generated $14.05 billion in international switched telephone service
traffic. Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, PartFour,InternationalCommunications, Table 4.1, InternationalMessage Telephone
Service of the Domestic United States (last modified
Jan. 13,
1998)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ CommonCarrier/Reports/ FCC-StateLink/socc.html>.
3. "A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this
chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services ......
47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (1997).
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requirements if doing so would serve the public interest. 4 Similarly,

the legislation favors carrier-to-carrier negotiations for facilities access
and interconnection instead of the customary application of tariffs
that are publicly available and applicable to similarly situated users.
The legislation has also created a shared jurisdictional scheme between the FCC and state public utility commissions. The combination
of state commissions' concerns over federal meddling with state matters and incumbent local exchange carriers' desire for a judicial conclusion that Congress has violated the Constitution 5 and that the FCC
has exceeded legislated authority 6 has resulted in significant delays in
implementation of the 1996 Act. This creates yet another paradox:
delay stifles local exchange competition, but also forecloses Bell Operating Company ("BOC") entry into long distance telecommunica7
tion markets.

I
Misguided Optimism About the Robustness of
Competition and a New World Order
After a contentious debate with several years of failed legislative
efforts, 8 the President, 9 legislators 10 and policymakers" viewed the
4. The Act authorizes the FCC to forbear from enforcing any regulation or provision
of the Act if the Commission determines that such enforcement is unnecessary to guard
against discrimination, ensure just and reasonable services, safeguard consumers and serve
the public interest. Title IV-Regulatory Reform, §§ 401(a)(1)-(3) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 160 (a)(1)-(3) (1996)).
5. Mark Landler, Stymied, SBC Seeks to Void Portion of Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
1997, at D1 (reporting that SBC Corporation filed an appeal in federal District Court
challenging the constitutionality of a provision in the 1996 Act, conditioning BOC entry
into interexchange markets).
6. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 1997-2 Trade Cases P 71, 876 (8th Cir. July
18, 1997) (finding the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in establishing pricing rules for local
exchange access, including resale discounts and unbundling of network elements).
7. Carriers like GTE and Sprint, which already provide long distance, inter-exchange
service, welcome delayed competition and therefore have an appellate strategy concentrating on forestalling or easing the scope of their local exchange interconnection obligations
and the discounts they must make available to resellers. "GTE has already benefited from
the suspension of the FCC rules while the [Iowa Utilities Board] case was pending, averaging 15% discounts [to resellers] off of retail prices, compared with the 17% to 25% discounts in the FCC rules." John R. Wilke & Leslie Couley, Court Rejects FCC Rules On Local Phone Networks, 1 WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE EDITION, CCXXVI (July 21, 1997)
<http://interactive.wsj.comleditioncurrentarticles/SB869451410112677500.html>
(on file
with author).
8. Until the broad-sweeping Telecommunications Act of 1996, throughout the late
1980s and early 1990s Congress considered two types of bills: 1) ones designed to remedy a
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specific problem or related set of problems (e.g., H.R. 3626, the "Antitrust and Communications Reform Act of 1994" that proposed to supersede the Modification of Final Judgment and amend the Communications Act of 1934 to permit regulated manufacturing of
telecommunication equipment by the Bell Operating Companies); and 2) broad-sweeping
bills designed to craft a complete overhaul of the Communications Act with the goals generally of promoting competition and reducing regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encouraging
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies (e.g. S. 1822, the
"Communications Act of 1994"; H.R. 3636, the "National Communications Competition
and Information Infrastructure Act"; H.R. 1555, the "Communications Act of 1995"; and
S. 652, the "Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995.").
These bills never generated a vote or consideration by the other House, primarily because affected groups, with comparable political clout, worked to stall progress, or to add
specific provisions they deemed essential. Thus, each house canceled out the other and
blocked progress toward a vote and passage. Until 1995, few in Congress considered the
political value in tackling free speech and other Constitutional questions arising from efforts to restrict access by minors and the public in general to obscene or indecent programming over broadcast, cable television and Internet sources. Only after several years of
false starts, direct involvement by the President and the Vice-President, and finely calibrated compromise was it possible for a single bill to reach the President for signature.
9. President Clinton stated:
This landmark legislation fulfills my Administration's promise to reform our telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to competition and private investment, promotes universal service and open access to information networks, and
provides for flexible government regulation. The Act opens up competition between local telephone companies, long distance providers and cable companies;
expands the reach of advanced telecommunications services to schools, libraries,
and hospitals; and requires the use of new V-chip technology to enable families to
exercise greater control over the television programming that comes into their
homes.
For nearly two decades, Vice President Gore has worked to spur the creation of a
national information superhighway. This Act lays the foundation for the robust
investment and development that will create such a superhighway to serve both
the private sector and the public interest.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Statement on the Telecom Bill
Signing, 1996 WL 54454 (White House) 1 (Feb. 9, 1996).
10. Senator Hollings, during the Senate Proceedings and debates, stated:
This comprehensive bill strikes a balance between competition and regulation.
New markets will be opened, competitors will begin to offer services, and consumers will be better served by having choices among providers of services. I urge
my colleagues to adopt this bill. I myself would go further in several areas covered by the legislation, and not as far in other areas. But I have seen that, unless
we adopt a comprehensive approach to legislation, any one sector of the telecommunications industry can stop this bill and checkmate the others. Telecommunications reform is too important to let this opportunity go by. This conference
agreement is an equitable approach to most of the areas covered by the bill, and I
urge my colleagues to support it.
Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 104th Congress, 2d Sess., S.687, Unanimous Consent Agreement, 142 CONG. REC. S. 687, S. 688 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
11. "This bill creates the promise of good, high-paying jobs for millions of Americans
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1996 Act as spawning a new age of robust competition in every sector
of the telecommunications and information processing industries.' 2 So
far, such optimism has vastly overstated the actual pace of facilitiesbased or even resale competition. 3 The primary short-term winners of
the 1996 Act "sweepstakes" include incumbent BOCs and their litigators 14 who have successfully secured judicial remedies that delay, re-

duce or eliminate portions of the duties the FCC considered necessary
to meet Congressional intent regarding the pricing of facilities interconnection, "a la carte" provisioning of network elements and offering
discounted local exchange services for resale. On the other hand, even
these winners have suffered losses from the failure of competition to
flourish as the FCC has rejected BOC applications for authority to
provide inter-LATA long distance telephone service. 5 Through litigation, the BOCs and other incumbent local exchange carriers
("ILECs") contribute to retarding local exchange competition, but

and the promise of competition and its benefits of lower prices, higher quality and better
service to us all." Statement by Reed E. Hundt,' Chairman Federal Communications Commission Regarding Passage of The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (visited Feb. 8, 1996)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh603.txt>.
12. One skeptic suggested caution: "There is no guarantee, however, that true competition will flourish, and it is certainly possible that unregulated fiefdoms will soon dot the
electronic landscape. The 1996 Act is an experiment, as, one would have to admit, all telecommunications regulation is an experiment." Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 253 (1997).
13. After having joined in the misguided initial enthusiasm, the general circulation
press later took a decidedly pessimistic view: "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
supposed to turn the phone companies into a pack of hungry competitors, willing to tear
one another to pieces for the privilege of providing you with low-cost phone service.... Instead all we've heard is howling [in courts and regulatory forums]." John Greewald, Hung
Up on Competition,TIME, July 21, 1997, at 50.
14. A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that:
FCC officials are particularly upset by the loss of this provision. They say its
practical effect will be to delay competition in markets around the country as they
get tangled up in the courts. "We cannot believe the Congress intended to have 93
district courts and 12 appeals courts and the Supreme Court deciding over the
next five years what 'based on costs' or other language means" Mr. Hundt said.
He noted that local phone companies have already sued over terms in more than
20 states.
Wilke & Couley, supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., Application by SBC Communications Inc., Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region, Inter-LATA Services in
Oklahoma, Memorandum Opinion and Order,F.C.C. 97-228 Dkt. No. 97-121 (1997). This
application was rejected for failure to satisfy all of the 14 requirements established in the
1996 Act. Id.
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such an outcome handicaps their ability to prove that they have met
requirements to open their networks.
The legislation also contributes to the general confusion over
what constitutes common carriage and what common carriers must do
by way of facilities interconnection and access to premises, switches,
.billing systems, directory information, and other forms of real, personal and intellectual property. The common carrier classification
once condemned a telecommunications service provider to pervasive
economic regulation. However, recent FCC and judicial interpretations have mitigated the burdens of common carriage and have
blurred the distinction between common and private carriage. 16 The
1996 Act specifies that commercial operators constitute common carriers, but this designation now ranges from the traditional status bolstered with quite specific interconnection obligations for the BOCs
and ILECs to something quite like private carriage.
Soon after the 1996 Act became law, the FCC proposed the
elimination of the tariff filing requirement of non-dominant interexchange carriers, 17 something the Commission had unsuccessfully attempted prior to enactment of the law.' 8 The FCC also proposed to
eliminate the requirement that carriers seek approval from the
Commission before expanding phone services to consumers within any
new geographic area that they are otherwise eligible to serve.19

16. For a discussion on how legal, regulatory and judicial decisions have blurred the
distinction between private and common carriage, see Robert M. Frieden, Schizophrenia
Among Carriers: How Common Carriers and Private Carriers Trade Places, 3 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (1997) (last modified Nov. 25, 1997)
<http://www.law.umich.edu/mttIr/volthree/frieden.html>; Robert M. Frieden, Contamination of the Common CarrierConcept in Telecommunications, 19 TELECOMM. POL. 685-697
(December 1995); Eli M. Noam, Beyond LiberalizationII: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage,18 TELECOMM. POL. 435-452 (1994).
17. Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
F.C.C. Dkt. No. 97-11; Notice of ProposedRulemaking, F.C.C. 97-6, 12 F.C.C.R. 1111 (Jan.
13, 1997).
18. On two separate occasions an appellate court has ruled that the FCC could not
accord non-dominant carriers the option of refraining from filing tariffs. See American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (voluntary detariffing); MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S.Ct. 2223 (1994) (mandatory detariffing).
19. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace Implementation of Sec. 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 11 F.C.C.R.
9564 Dkt. No. 96-61. See also FirstMemorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,
F.C.C. 97-269 (July 30, 1997).
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A. What Congress Contemplated
The 1996 Act overhauls the Communications Act of 1934, establishing a law that expressly favors competition and envisions a
"network of networks" 20 with localities served by a multiplicity of operators, each interconnected with all others. 21 The 1996 Act provides
greater specificity as to what obligations a telecommunications, carrier
has toward other carriers, particularly for BOCs and ILECs vis a vis
market entrants insofar as the terms and conditions for interconnection and access to another carrier's facilities. Despite greater specificity, the 1996 Act directs the FCC to implement its new policies, and in
doing so the Commission had to initiate dozens of rulemakings, many
on an expedited basis even as stakeholders pursued litigation to stay
or overturn one completed aspect of the overall package of implementation dockets.2 2
At the time of this writing the FCC had not yet completed all
implementation proceedings. However, even now one can begin to
identify how the legislation creates winners and losers, or at least how
it comparatively supports or handicaps new market access opportunities.
The 1996 Act and FCC's implementation strive to stimulate more
resale and facilities-based competition of both local and long distance
telephone service, while at the same time fostering a leveled playing
field among incumbents and market entrants. While promoting competition, the drafters of the 1996 Act evidenced an unwillingness to
rely solely on marketplace factors, particularly for several preferred
20. See Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization-Fromthe Network of Networks to the
System of Systems, 18 TELECOMM. POL. 286-294 (1994).

21.

For a more comprehensive summary of the 1996 Act provisions, see Christopher

H. Sterling, Understanding the Telecommunications Act of 1996, book reviews, 49 FED.
COMM. L. J. 509 (Feb. 1997); Carl B. Kress, The 1996 Telekommunikationsgesetz and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Toward More Competitive Markets in Telecommunications in Germany and the UnitedStates, 49 FED. COMM. L.J., 551 (Apr. 1997),
22. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15612 Dkt. No. 96-98 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition First Report and Order]; Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 13042 Dkt. No.
96-98 (1996); Second Order on Reconsideration,F.C.C. 96-476 (Dec. 16, 1996), petition for
review pending and partialstay granted,sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 1997 WL 403401
(8th Cir.), partialstay lifted in part, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321 and consolidated
cases, WL 589204 (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1996), partially vacated slip op. July 18, 1997; Imple-

mentation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
F.C.C. 96-33 Dkt. No., (I.C.) 96-98; appeal docketed sub nom. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v.

FCC, (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1996). See also SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 7:97-CV-163X, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 1997).
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constituencies including schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics, low income consumers and telephone subscribers in rural and insular 23 areas. 24 The 1996 Act paradoxically seeks to remove market entry barriers even as it broadens the concepts of universal service in
telecommunications, the required undertaking of carriers and how
much consumers must pay to support this mandate. '
The 1996 Act can be characterized as having removed legislative
and judicial barriers to market entry. For example, it eliminates crossownership restrictions on telephone, company provisions of cable
television service, and vice versa. Likewise, the 1996 Act eliminates
the remaining business restrictions imposed on the Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") by the Modification of Final Judgment,25 viz., inter-Local Access and Transport Area ("LATA"), 26 long
distance telephone service and telecommunications equipment manufacturing after the companies meet a fourteen point competitive check

23. Insular areas include states, commonwealths and possessions of the United States
not part of the contiguous 48 states, such as Guam and American Samoa.
24. Section 254(b) articulates expanded universal service principles including the
mandate that "access to advanced telecommunications and information services should be
provided in all regions of the Nation," 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(2) (1996); that "low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost area, should have access to telecommunications and information services ... reasonably comparable to those services provided in
urban areas ... " 47 U.S.C. §254(b)(3); and that "[ellementary and secondary schools and
classrooms, health care providers and libraries should have [discounted] access to advanced telecommunications services as described in subsection (b) of this section." 47
U.S.C. § 254(b)(6).
25. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
26. Under the 1996 Act, a "LATA" is
a contiguous geographic area (A) established before February 8, 1996, by a
[BOC] such that no exchange area includes points within more than 1 metropolitan statistical area, consolidated metropolitan statistical area, or State, except as
expressly permitted under the AT&T Consent Decree; or (B) established or
modified by a [BOC] after February 8, 1996, and approved by the Commission.
47 U.S.C. § 153(25) (1996). LATAs were created as part of the Modification of Final
Judgment's (MFJ) plan of reorganization, under which the BOCs were divested from
AT&T. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-234 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983) (plan of reorganization), affd sub nom. California v.
United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., No.
82-0192 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1996) (vacating the MFJ). Pursuant to the MFJ, "all [BOC] territory in the continental United States [was] divided into LATAs, generally centering upon a
city or other identifiable community of interest." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569
F. Supp. 990,993-94 (D.D.C. 1983).
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list evidencing the existence of, or opportunity for full and fair inter27
connection and facilities access by other carriers.
Congress leaves to the FCC and state public utility commissions
the task of ensuring full and fair interconnection, as well as other issues requiring complex economic analysis. For example, the FCC and
state public utility commissions must determine appropriate discounts
for resold LEC services and the actual cost of providing switching and
routing of traffic generated by competing LECs, interexchange carriers ("IXCs"), and end users. Billions of dollars in carrier revenues and
cross-subsidies to promote universal- service are at stake as the FCC
attempts to define a national framework for rational cost-based pricing and to move from implicit to explicit universal service subsidies.
For example, IXCs pay LECs an access charge of about 3 cents a minute for the use of LEC facilities to originate and terminate long distance toll calls. IXCs estimate that the actual cost of such access lies in
a range from 0.4-1.2 cents, meaning that current access charges exceed
cost by 250-700 percent and provide a large source of funds for either
profits or universal service subsidies. 28 The FCC and state commissions have the unenviable task of sorting out complex pricing issues
and determining competitively neutral facilities interconnection and
access issues for local and long distance carriers, and for end users.
B. Local Competition
The 1996 Act orders the removal of statutory, regulatory, and operational barriers to local telephone services competition. 29 The local
competition provisions of the legislation added new sections 251, 252,
and 253 to the Communications Act of 1934. Section 251 establishes
general interconnection obligations for all telecommunications carriers, 3° delineates further obligations for LECs, 31 and prescribes additional requirements for ILECs.32 Section 251 requires an ILEC to
27.

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xiv) (1996).

28. AT&T claimed that, "the current average per-minute access rates of the BOCs
are nearly seven times the forward-looking economic cost of providing that service, and
that total interstate access charges collected today from interexchange carriers exceed for-

ward-looking economic cost by $11 billion, or 70 percent of the total." Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 96-262,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C.

96-488, 1996 WL 733469 (F.C.C.) 1 11 (Dec. 24, 1996).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996).
30.
31.

47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(1)-(2).
47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(1)-(5).

32. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(1)-(6).
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provide interconnection at any technically feasible point, with
equivalent quality as that provided to itself and affiliates and at just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. 33 Section 252 establishes
procedures that state commissions, ILECs, and new entrants must
follow to implement the requirements of section 251, including the examination and approval of carrier-to-carrier interconnection arrangements.34 Finally, Section 253 bars state and local regulations that prohibit or have the effect 35of prohibiting entities from offering
telecommunications services.
The 1996 Act contemplates that ILECs and market entrants will
negotiate terms and conditions for interconnection and resold services.36 If an ILEC and requesting carrier are unable to reach a negotiated agreement, either party may ask the state utility commission to
arbitrate the disputed issues. 37 The 1996 Act requires ILECs to provide interconnection and nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis. 38 In implementing the legislation, the
FCC identified the following minimum set of network elements that
ILECs must provide to requesting telecommunications carriers, many
of which are analogous to interstate access rate elements: network interface devices; local loops; local and tandem switches (including all
software features provided by such switches); interoffice transmission
facilities; signaling and call-related database facilities; operations support systems and information; and operator and directory assistance
facilities. 39 States may require unbundling of additional elements.
Section 251(a) of the 1996 Act imposes general common carrier
interconnection obligations on all telecommunications carriers. 40 Section 251(b) imposes on all LECs additional requirements, including
the obligation to lease services to other telecommunication carriers
for resale to end users, to provide access to rights-of-way, and to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transport and ter33. See 47U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2), (c)(3).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 252.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). Section 253 also authorizes the Commission to preempt any
law or regulation that violates this section. 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(1).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
39. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 96-98, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. 96-182, 366
[hereinafter Local Competition NPRM].

40. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a).
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mination of traffic, including that generated by Commercial Mobile
Radio Service providers, such as mobile cellular radio and personal
communication service operators. 41 In addition to the above requirements, section 251(c) of the 1996 Act requires ILECs to make available to new entrants interconnection and access to unbundled network
elements and to offer LEC retail services for resale to telecommunications carriers at wholesale rates.42 Access to unbundled elements
and resale opportunities makes it possible for new ventures to enter
local exchange markets without incurring the time and expense in
duplicating the existing facilities operated by incumbent carriers.
In implementing the 1996 Act, the FCC seeks to promote full
facilities-based entry, resale of ILEC services, or a hybrid of the two
whereby market entrants purchase only those unbundled network
elements they need to erect a complete service. To achieve such facilities-based and resale competition, section 251(c)(2) requires ILECs
to provide interconnection to any requesting telecommunications carrier at any technically feasible point.43 The interconnection must be at
least equal in quality to that provided by the ILEC to itself or its affiliates, and must be provided on rates, terms, and conditions that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."
Additionally, section 251(c)(6) requires ILECs to provide physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements at the ILEC's premises, except that the
ILEC may provide virtual collocation if it demonstrates to the appropriate state regulatory. commission that physical collocation is not
practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations. 45 ILECs
must provide any technically feasible method of interconnection or
access requested by a telecommunications carrier, including physical
collocation, virtual collocation, and interconnection at meet points, a
41. 47 U.S'C. § 251(b).
42. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)-(4). Section 251(f)(1) provides for exemption of the requirements in section 251(c) for rural telephone companies (as defined by the 1996 Act)
under certain circumstances. 47 U.S.C. § 251(f)(1). Section 251(f)(2) permits LECS with
fewer than 2 percent of the nation's subscriber lines to petition for suspension or modification of the requirements in sections 251(b) or (c). 47 U.S.C. § 251(f)(2). States are primarily responsible -for interpreting the provisions of section 251(f) through rulemaking and
adjudicative proceedings, and are responsible for determining whether a LEC in a particular instance is entitled to exemption, suspension, or modification of section 251 requirements. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(f)(1)-(2).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(C)-(D).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).

1997]

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Acr OF 1996

location where one carrier's geographical service coverage ends and
46
another carrier's begins or starts to overlap.
The 1996 Act also requires the FCC to establish procedures for
nondiscriminatory access by cable television systems and telecommunications carriers to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned by
utilities or LECs. 47 The Commission's implementing Order includes
several specific rules as well as a number of more general guidelines
designed to facilitate the negotiation and establishment of fair,
pro-competitive access agreements without the need for regulatory intervention.48 Additionally, an expedited dispute resolution mechanism
exists to address instances where carrier-to-carrier negotiations fail to
reach a closure.
C.

Number Portability, Dialing Parity, and Other Numbering Issues

Section 251(b) requires all LECs to offer, "to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements
prescribed by the Commission. '49 The 1996 Act defines number portability as "the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain,
at the same location, existing telecommunications numbers without
impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching from
one telecommunications carrier to another." 50 In implementing this
requirement the FCC first required all LECs to implement a
long-term number portability method in the 100 largest Metropolitan
Statistical Areas ("MSAs") according to a phased deployment schedule concluding on December 31, 1998.51 Thereafter, for areas outside
the 100 largest MSAs, each LEC must make number portability available within six months after a specific request by another telecommunications carrier.52 The FCC also required all cellular, broadband personal communications services and some Specialized Mobile Radio
46. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)(B), (C)(6).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 224.
48. Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, F.C.C. Dkt. No.
97-98, Notice of ProposedRule Making, F.C.C. 97-94, 1997 WL 119618 (F.C.C.) (Mar. 14,
1997).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 153(30).
51. See Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, 3 (1996); Telephone Number Portability, First
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,1997 WL 106479 (F.C.C.) 2 (Mar.
11, 1997) [hereinafter Telephone Number Portability].
52. Telephone Number Portability, 1997 WL 106479 (F.C.C.) (Mar. 11, 1997).
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providers to be able to deliver calls from their networks to dialed
numbers by December 31, 1998, to offer number portability throughout their networks and to have the capability to support nationwide
54
roaming 53 by June 30, 1999.

Rather than choosing a particular technology for the provision of
number portability, the FCC established performance criteria that any
long-term number portability method selected by a LEC must meet.
The FCC required the maintenance of regional numbering databases
by one or more independent administrators selected by the North
American Numbering Council impaneled to address telephone num55
bering issues.
Section 251(b)(3) requires all LECs to provide dialing parity to
providers of telephone exchange and toll services.5 6 This means that
customers can choose different carriers for different services without
having to dial extra digits. To achieve this objective, the Commission
established minimum federal standards for interstate, intrastate, local,
and toll calls. 57 The Commission also concluded that customers should

have the option of selecting different carriers for routing intra-LATA
and inter-LATA toll calls.58 It imposed a deadline of no later than
February 8, 1999 for LECs to make it possible for customers to have
the option of pre-selecting two different "Primary Interexchange Car59
riers" for direct dial (0+ and 1+) access.

53. Roaming refers to the use of a wireless service outside the subscriber's local calling area.
54. Telephone Number Portability, 1997 WL 106479 (F.C.C.) (Mar. 11, 1997).
55. "[T]he North American Numbering Council will make recommendations to the
Commission, develop policy, initially resolve disputes and guide the North American
Numbering Plan Administrator. The North American Numbering Plan Administrator will
process number assignment applications and maintain administrative number databases."
Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
2588,91 1,8-12 (1995).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (1996).
57. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm's Act of
1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 18, 311, 11 202-219 (Apr. 25, 1996);
Commission Implements Dialing Parity, Non-discriminatory Access, Network Disclosure,
and Numbering Administration Provisions of the Telecomm's Act of 1996, 1996 WL
450042 (F.C.C.) (Aug. 8, 1996).
.58. Commission Implements Dialing Parity, Non-Discriminatory Access, Network
Disclosure, and Numbering Admin. Provisions of the Telecomm Act of 1996, 1996 WL
450042 (F.C.C.) (Aug. 8, 1996).
59. The Commission applied dialing parity requirements to pay telephones. See Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommuncations Act of 1996, Report and Order, 1996 WL 547458 (F.C.C.) (Sept. 20,
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Section 251(e)(1) vests the FCC with exclusive jurisdiction over
"those portions of the North American Numbering Plan 60 that pertain
to the United States... [with authority to delegate to] State commissions or other entities all or any portion of such jurisdiction." 61 On the
matter of abbreviated dialing codes-the use of fewer than seven digits to complete a call as is the case with 911 access to police and emergency services, the FCC authorized the continuing use of 311 for a
non-emergency service, and 611 and 811 for access to LEC repair and
business service offices respectively. 62 The Commission prohibited
LECs from offering enhanced services via any three digit code unless
it offers access to the code on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis to
competing enhanced service providers in the local service area for
which the LEC is using the code for access to its enhanced services.
D. New Structural and Accounting Safeguards and Methodologies

To ensure a level competitive playing field between incumbent
and new carriers, the FCC had to erect significant structural 63 and accounting safeguards, 64 particularly in view of new market opportunities for the BOCs, viz., inter-LATA long distance services and manufacturing, and the expectation that new LECs will require access to
some of the facilities and services of ILECs. 65 Also the FCC and state
1996).
60. The North American Numbering Plan is the basic numbering scheme, e.g., areas
codes, for the telecommunications networks located in Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent, Turks &
Caicos Islands, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States (including Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(1) (1996).
62. Use of Nl1 Codes and Other Abbreviated Dialing Arrangements, First Report
and Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1997 WL 68052 (F.C.C.) (Feb. 19,
1997).
63. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, As Amended, FirstReport and Order and FurtherNotice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 1996 WL 734160 (F.C.C.) (Dec. 24, 1996) [hereinafter NonAccounting Safeguards].
64. Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Accounting Safeguards
under the Telecommunicationss Act of 1996, Report and Order, 1996 WL 734166 (F.C.C.)
(Dec. 24, 1996).
65. The 1996 Act favors the accelerated onset of competition that resale achieves.
However, resale opportunities may create disincentives for new carriers to commit the financial and other resources needed to convert to partial or complete facilities-based coverage. See Non-Accounting Safeguards, 1996 WL 734160 (F.C.C.) 1 1-13.
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public utility commissions needed a basis for assessing what constitutes fair compensation when a market competitor requires access to a
portion of an ILEC's installed network, or simply desires discounted
charges when reselling local retail services of the ILEC.
Sections 271 and 272 condition a BOC's entry into inter-LATA
long distance telephone services and manufacturing. 66 Upon meeting a
14 point competitive checklist designed to promote fair competition,
BOCs must establish separate manufacturing and long distance service subsidiaries to ensure that even in the absence of full competition
in the local exchange marketplace, a BOC would not engage in anticompetitive, discriminatory or cost-shifting practices designed to favor
its new ventures which would enter other competitive markets. Under
traditional rate of return regulation and even under incentive regulation involving price caps, a BOC might "allocate improperly to its
regulated core business costs that would be properly attributable to its
67
competitive ventures."
The FCC has developed a cost allocation methodology for use by
state regulators when establishing actual rates for interconnection and
the purchase of unbundled elements. The Commission used a controversial cost-based pricing methodology based on "forward-looking"
economic costs, an estimate of the costs an efficient LEC currently
would incur to provide such interconnection rather than an estimate
of the carrier's actual or historical costs.6 8 The Commission pricing
methodology is based on a staff study of the "Total Service Long-Run
Incremental Cost" ("TSLRIC") incurred by LECs to provide network
elements needed for interconnection and access to unbundled elements. 69 Because the TSLRIC studies pertain to network elements,
the FCC renamed them "Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost"
66. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-72 (1996).
67. Non-Accounting Safeguards, 1996 WL 734160 (F.C.C.) I 11.
For example, a BOC may have an incentive to degrade services and facilities
furnished to its affiliate's rivals, in order to deprive those rivals of efficiencies that
its affiliate enjoys. Moreover, to the extent carriers offer both local and interLATA services as a bundled offering, a BOC that discriminates against the rivals
of its affiliates could entrench its position in local markets by making these rivals'
offerings less attractive. With respect to BOC manufacturing activities, a BOC
may have an incentive to purchase only equipment manufactured by its section
272 affiliate, even if such equipment is more expensive or of lower quality than
that available from other manufacturers.
Id.
68. Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carrier, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 1996 WL 733469 (F.C.C.) 91 170-221, cf. nn.17, 22.
69. Id.
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("TELRIC") studies.7" The Commission ordered that prices be set at
TELRIC plus a reasonable share of forward-looking joint and common costs.7 1 The Commission contemplated that most state regulatory
commissions would use its proposed methodology when assessing the
merits of a LEC access proposal, or when resolving a'request for arbitration between ILECs and their competitors. For states not yet
adopting this methodology, the Commission also established default
proxies-actual rate ranges of 0.2-0.4 cents per minute for switching,
and a ceiling of 0.15 cents per minute for tandem switching-that a
state commission may use to resolve arbitrations even before completion of their own TELRIC study.72 Language in the 1996 Act also directs the FCC to determine rates on an "avoided cost standard," that
is, to reduce charges to carriers on the basis of costs the incumbent
carrier would not have to incur in providing such access or services for
resale, such as sales and marketing expenses.
In April 1996, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
to allow the public to comment on the establishment of regulations to
implement interconnection requirements. 73 Under the 1996 Act
ILECs must:
" Negotiate interconnection agreements in good faith;
" Provide interconnection to their networks on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions;
" Provide access to each separate network element such as
subscriber numbers, databases, or signaling systems;
" Offer resale of their telecommunications services at wholesale rates;
" Provide reasonable public notice of changes to their networks; and
* Provide physical collocation (facilities sharing) or virtual
collocation if physical collocation is impractical. 4
Despite its best efforts the FCC could not implement the 1996
Act without delay caused by litigation. Given the stakes of the litigation and its ability to alter the competitive playing field, this delay was
a predictable outcome. Soon after the FCC released its Local Competition First Report and Order in August, 1996, many ILECs and state
public utility commissions filed motions for stays on grounds that the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. 1 247.
73. Implementation of Local Competition Provisionsin the TelecommunicationsAct of
1996,61 Fed. Reg. 18311 (1996).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (1996).
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Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in establishing pricing policies
that address local, intrastate telecommunication services.75 The petitioners convinced the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that it should
77
76
temporarily stay pricing provisions and the "pick and choose" rule
of the Local Competition First Report and Order.
In deciding the merits of numerous appeals, the court identified
the following defects in the FCC's Local Competition First Report
78
and Order:
* Establishing pricing rules based on the forward-looking TELRIC
79
methodology;
* Allowing requesting LECs the "pick and choose" option when
80
negotiating an interconnection agreement;
* Specifying the terms and conditions exempting rural and small
LECs from the ILEC requirements;81
! Establishing the FCC, instead of federal district courts, as the
forum for reviewing and hearing complaints about ILEC
agreements approved by state commissions; 82 and
* Requiring state commission approval of interconnection
83
agreements negotiated prior to enactment of the 1996 Act.

75. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 421 (8th Cir. 1996), motion to vacate stay
denied, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996).
76. The FCC's "pick and choose" rule would have allowed requesting LECs the opportunity to incorporate any individual provision of any interconnection agreement that an
ILEC previously had negotiated with one or more other carriers. Id. at 423.
77. Id. at 421.
78. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321, 96-3406, 96-3410, 96-3414, 96-3416, 96-3418,
96-3424, 96-3430, 96-3446, 96-3444, 96-3450, 96-3453, 96-3460, 96-3507, 96-3519, 96-3520,
96-3603, 96-3608, 96-3696, 96-3708, 96-3709, 96-3756, 96-3901, 96-3906, 96-3982, 1997 WL
403401, (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
79. Id. at *3.
80. The Commission based its pick and choose rule, codified at 47 C.F.R. § 51.809
(1996), based on subsection 252(i) of the 1996 that provides: "A local exchange carrier
shall make available any interconnection, service, or network element provided under an
agreement'approved under thissection to which it is a party to any other requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and conditions as those provided in the
agreement." 47 U.S.C. § 252(i) (1996).
81. Iowa Utils. Bd., 1997 WL 403401, at *13.
82. "We also believe that state commissions retain the primary authority to enforce
the substantive terms of the [interconnection] agreements made pursuant to sections 251
and 252." Id. at *14.
83. Id. at *16.
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In each of these instances, the Eighth Circuit rejected the Commission's action as exceeding its jurisdiction and scope of authority as
established by the 1996 Act.

4

Simply put, the Eighth Circuit rejected the assertion of federal
jurisdiction over intrastate service pricing in view of the clear meaning
of section 152(b) of the Communications Act, since the 1996 Act
failed to explicitly authorize federal rate regulation.8 5 The Court con-

trasted this aspect of the 1996 Act with the explicit granting of federal
authority in prior amendments of the Communications Act regarding
cable television.

86

The court rejected the "impossibility" exception narrowly drawn
by the Supreme Court in Louisiana Public Service Commission v.
FCC,87 whereby the FCC may preempt state regulation only if it is impossible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of FCC
regulation and state regulation would negate the FCC's lawful
authority over interstate communication. 88 In contrast to federal cable
television "no provision of the [1996] Act unambiguously requires
84. The Eighth Circuit stated:
Our review of the extensive arguments in this case has confirmed our initial belief
that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the pricing rules regarding
local telephone service. We also remain convinced that the FCC's "pick and
choose" rule would frustrate the Act's design to make privately negotiated
agreements the preferred route to local telephone competition.
Id. at *2.
85. The court noted:
Any ambiguity regarding the FCC's vacuum of authority over local telecommunications pricing under the [Communications] Act is resolved by the operation of
section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). Section 2(b)
provides that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the
[FCC] jurisdiction with respect to ...charges, classification, practices, services,
facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service."
Id. at *5.
86. The court further noted that:
In sharp contrast to the Telecommunications Act, several provisions of the Cable
Act explicitly grant the Commission the authority to regulate the rates of cable
companies and explicitly require state authorities to follow the Commission's
ratemaking rules. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)(3)(b) (1994).... Consequently, we conclude that the Act plainly grants the state commissions, not the FCC, the authority to determine the rates involved in the implementation of the total competition
provisions of the Act.
Id.
87. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
88. Id. at *6 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375-76 n.4
(1986); California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied., 115 S.Ct. 1427
(1995); NARUC v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422,429 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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rates for the local competition provisions to comply with FCCprescribed requirements, no provision unambiguously directs the FCC
to issue such pricing regulations, and there is no straightforward and
unambiguous modification of section 2(b) in the Act." 9
The FCC's network unbundling rules largely passed muster with
the appellate court, despite ILEC assertions that the unbundling rules
would lead to "cherry picking" of choice customers without any effi90
ciency or technology gains.
The court acknowledged that a requesting carrier need not have
built or acquired any portion of a telecommunications network before
qualifying to purchase unbundled elements and that market entrants

would opt for unbundled network access instead of resale. 9 Having
vacated parts of the FCC's unbundling rules, the court rejected claims
that they interfere with intellectual property rights of third parties or
92
constitute a taking of ILEC property as not ripe for review.
The court agreed that the FCC could reasonably conclude that
subsection 251(c)(3) of the 1996 Act included as a network element
ILEC operational support systems, operator services, directory assistance, and vertical switching features including caller identification,

call forwarding and call waiting.93 The court also accepted the Commission's definition of what constitutes a "technically feasible point"
for direct interconnection and access to unbundled network elements, 94 but specified that this term applies to points where such ac89. Iowa Utils. Bd., 1997 WL 403401 at *6 (emphasis added).
90. Id at *25. Having vacated the FCC's pricing rules and discount proxy and without
knowing what state-determined rates will be "the petitioners' argument that competing
carriers will incur only minimal costs in gaining access to incumbent LECs' networks... [with] no incentive to build their own [network] is merely speculative at best."
Id. at *27. The court noted that while Congress may have envisioned facilities-based competition for local services in the future, the rules favor expedited market entry presumably
by resellers and operators with only partially constructed networks. Id. at *28.
91. A reseller is able to purchase only as many services.., as it needs to satisfy
its customer demand. A carrier providing services through unbundled access,
however, must make an up-front investment that is large enough to pay for the
cost of acquiring access to all of the unbundled elements of an incumbent LEC's
network that are necessary to provide local telecommunications services without
knowing whether consumer demand will be sufficient to cover such expenditures.
Id. at *26. The court also rejected the FCC's requirement that ILECs recombine elements
on request. Id. at *25.
92. The court also approved the FCC's determination of ILEC resale obligations, because the Commission did not provide a specific methodology or rate. Id. at *31.
93. Id. at *19.
94. Id. at *21.
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cess may occur, not which elements must be unbundled.9 5 The court
also accepted the FCC's use of requesting carrier need for access to a
proprietary network element if the ILEC's failure to offer such access
would impair the requesting carrier's ability to provide service, 96 but
rejected the Commission's quality of service rules that it interpreted as
requiring ILECs to provide service superior to that which they provide
97
themselves.
E.

Universal Service

Section 254 of the 1996 Act establishes an explicit mandate for
the FCC to promote universal access to telecommunication services. 98
The 1996 Act directs the Commission to commence a proceeding to
implement sections 254 and 214(e) of the Communications Act and to
refer such proceeding to a Federal-State Joint Board. 99 The Joint
Board was given nine months to make recommendations to the
Commission, including a definition of the services to be supported by
federal universal service support mechanisms and a timetable for the
implementation of such recommendations.' The FCC initiated the
Joint Board proceeding in March 1996,101 and the Joint Board issued

its Recommended Decision in November of that year. 102
The 1996 Act established several requirements for federal universal service support mechanisms.103 It directed the Joint Board and the
FCC to base the preservation and advancement of universal service on
six general principles, but stipulated that additional appropriate principles might be considered." ° These six principles are:
Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates;
95. Id. at *22.
96. Id. at *5-*23.
97. Id. at *24.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1996).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Order EstablishingJoint Board, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 96-45, F.C.C. 96-93 (Mar. 8, 1996)
[hereinafter Universal Service NPRM].
102. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 96-45, Recommended Decision, F.C.C. 96J-3, 1996 WL 656113 (F.C.C.) (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Joint
Board Recommended Decision].
103. Id.
104. Id.
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* Access to advanced services should be available in all regions of
the nation;
" Access to basic and advanced services should be available to customers in rural and high cost areas and to low-income consumers
at rates comparable to those in urban areas;
" Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions should be made by
all telecommunications providers to the preservation and advancement of universal service;
" Specific and predictable support mechanisms should exist at both
the federal and state level; and
" Schools, health care facilities, and libraries should have access to
10 5
advanced telecommunications services.
The Commission, after receiving the recommendations of the
Joint Board, had to identify specific services for federal universal
service support'0 6 and had to establish cost allocation for the provision, maintenance and upgrading of the specifically identified facilities
and services. 107 Such support is to be available to all telecommunications carriers eligible to receive universal service subsidies.108 The
legislation requires explicit universal service funding109 and mandates
equitable and non-discriminatory sharing of the financial burden
among all telecommunications carriers providing interstate telecom110
munications services.
In its Recommended Decision, the Federal-State Joint Board
concluded that several universal service mechanisms currently implemented by jurisdictional separations, allocation of network costs between intrastate and interstate services, and IXC access charge structures must be replaced or modified to meet the amended
Communications Act's requirements that support mechanisms be
explicit, specific, predictable and sufficient to preserve and advance
105.

Id.

106. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1).
107. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(e), (k).
108.

47 U.S.C. §§ 254(e), 214(e); see also Joint Board Recommended Decision, supra

note 102, 1 155-62; Joint Statement of Managers, S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 131
(1996) ("The conferees intend that only eligible telecommunications carriers should re)
ceive support from specific Federal universal service support mechanisms.
[hereinafter JointExplanatory Statement].
109. 47 U.S.C. § 254(e). See also Joint Explanatory Statement, S. CONF. REP. NO. 104230, at 131 ("In keeping with the conferees' intent that all universal service support should
be clearly identified, [section 254(e)] states that such support should be made explicit.. ").

110. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
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universal service. Accordingly, the Joint Board recommended that
changes be made to: 1) the high cost assistance fund; 111 and 2) that the
Dial Equipment Minutes ("DEM") weighting program 12 and Long
Term Support ("LTS")" 3 be phased out and replaced by a new explicit universal service mechanism." 4 The Joint Board's recommendations will obligate the FCC to revise its IXC access charge rules to
eliminate any implicit universal service subsidization, to prevent
ILECs from recovering the same costs twice from both local and interexchange carriers, and to provide the same subsidies to nonincumbent LECs as are provided to ILECs for serving high-cost or
low-income subscribers.
In its Universal Service NPRM, the FCC asked whether current
charges imposed on IXCs contained an implicit universal service support mechanism. 115 While the Joint Board did not reach this question,
it suggested that it would be desirable for LECs to recover on' a flatrate basis with non-traffic sensitive costs that do not vary with use because per-minute collection is economically inefficient.' 6
The 1996 Act identified specific beneficiaries of the universal
17
service mission: schools, health care provider facilities, and libraries.
Additionally, the Act directed the FCC and state commissions to
promote in all regions of the nation, services "that are reasonably
comparable to'those services provided in urban areas and that are
available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for
similar services in urban areas." ' The law established a guarantee
that some set of telecommunications services are available to all at affordable rates.119 According to the 1996 Act, the FCC will articulate
what this "universal service" package constitutes, and how it will
evolve over time and take into account advances in telecommunica1 20
tions and information technologies and services.

111.

(1996).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

47 C.F.R.

§§ 36.601, .611-.613, .621-.622, .631, .641, .701, .711, .721, .731, .741

47 C.F.R. § 36.125(b).
47 C.F.R. §§ 69.105, 69.502, 69.603(e), 69.612.
Joint Board Recommended Decision,supra note 102, 1 268-82.
Universal Service NPRM, supra note 101, 11 113-14.
Joint Board Recommended Decision,supra note 102, 1 775-76.
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6) (1996).
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3).
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1).
47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).
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F. Universal Service Order and Reconsideration

On May 8, 1997, the FCC issued a Report and Order on universal
service that largely adopted the Joint Board recommendations. 121 The
FCC determined that the following services warranted subsidization
to achieve ubiquity:
* voice grade access to the public switched network, with the ability
to place and receive calls;
9 Dual Tone Multifrequency ("touch tone") signaling or its
functional equivalent;
* single-party service;
" access to emergency services, including 911 and Enhanced 911
(which identifies a caller's location);
* access to operator services;
* access to interexchange services;
* access to directory assistance; and
• Lifeline and Link Up services for qualifying low-income
122
consumers.
As recommended by the Joint Board, the FCC required eligible
carriers 123 seeking universal service subsidization to offer each of the
designated services. The Commission will allow a transition period for
carriers currently unable to provide single-party service, enhanced 911
service, and toll limitation services. Additionally, as recommended by
the Joint Board, the Commission will convene another Federal-State
Joint Board to review the definition of universal service on or before
January 1, 2001.
On the matter of telephone service affordability, the FCC accepted the Joint-Board's recommendation that states should monitor
rates and non-rate factors, such as subscribership levels, to ensure local telephone service remains affordable. The Report and Order
noted that a correlation exists between subscribership and affordabil-

121. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, F.C.C. Dkt.
No. 96-45, F.C.C. 97-157 (May 8, 1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Report and Order],
on recon., F.C.C. 97-246 (July 10, 1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Reconsideration Order].
122. Universal Service Report and Order,supra note 121.
123. Section 214(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 254 (1996), defines eligible telecommunications carriers as common carriers eligible to receive universal service support in accordance with Section 254 based on their
designation of eligibility by state commissions for intrastate service and by the FCC for unserved interstate services). See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1996).
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ity.124 To achieve universal service the Commission concluded that
eligible telecommunications carriers should be free to use any available technology to achieve universal service, including wireless options. For service to rural, insular, and high cost areas, the Commission found that carriers should use forward-looking economic costs,
but that the cost estimation methodologies presented thus far had not
proved sufficiently reliable. Pending completion of an additional proceeding on costing methodologies, the FCC offered states the option
of using the Commission's existing TELRIC mechanisms or their own
forward-looking cost studies for determining universal service support. Until the FCC releases a new forward-looking costing mechanism, non-rural carriers will continue to receive high cost loop support
and long term support based on existing universal service mechanisms.
Consistent with the Joint Board's recommendation, rural carriers
will continue to receive the full level of support they receive under the
current mechanism with some minor modifications. The Commission
contemplated working with the Joint Board on developing an appropriate forward-looking mechanism for rural carriers and recommended that the Joint Board establish a rural task force to start
working on it. Because a forward-looking methodology will generate
less total funds for supporting high cost areas, the FCC established a
mechanism scheduled to commence in 1999 which allows interstate
and intrastate carriers to share the difference with a national benchmark level sponsored by the Federal Universal Service Fund. In the
interest of fairness among rural and more urbanized states, the FCC
found that states should be free to develop their own universal service
programs. Additionally, the Commission will refer this issue to the
Joint Board for further review. As recommended by the Joint Board,
the Commission will also continue to explore the use of competitive
bidding as a mechanism to provide universal service.
The FCC's Report and Order also modifies the Lifeline program
that reduces qualified low-income consumers' monthly phone charges
with matching federal and state funds. The related Link Up program
provides federal support that reduces qualified low-income consumers' initial incumbent wireline LEC connection charges by up to onehalf and is currently funded by contributions from IXCs. The Com124. "We agree with the Joint Board that there is a correlation between subscribership
and affordability and we further agree that joint examination by the Commission and the
states of the factors that may contribute to low penetration is warranted in areas, such as
insular areas, where subscribership levels are particularly low." Universal Service Report
and Order,supra note 121, 23.
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mission's Report and Order expands the Lifeline program to make it
available in every state, territory and commonwealth. It not only increases the federal Lifeline support amount to $5.25 in federal funding, but matches it with $1.00 for every $2.00 of state support up to a
maximum of $1.75. This increases the maximum federal support to
$7.00. The Report and Order also makes the contribution and distribution of low-income support competitively and technologically neutral by requiring all providers of interstate telecommunications services to contribute, including non-common carriers and payphone
aggregators. All eligible telecommunications carriers, including wireless carriers, are required to receive support for offering Lifeline and
Link Up service.
The FCC also adopted the Joint Board's recommendations for
providing eligible schools and library discounts on the purchase of all
commercially available telecommunications services, Internet access,
and internal connections. Eligible schools will qualify for discounts
ranging from 20% to 90%, with the higher discounts available to the
most disadvantaged schools and libraries. Also those institutions in
high cost areas will qualify for higher discounts. The Commission
capped total expenditures for universal service support for schools and
libraries at $2.25 billion per year. Funding authority will roll-over into
following years, if necessary, for funds not disbursed in any given year.
All public and not-for-profit health care providers located in rural
areas will receive universal service support not to exceed an annual
cap of $400 million. A health care provider may obtain telecommunications service at a transmission capacity not to exceed a T-1 line
providing 1.544 megabits per second of throughput. The cost of such
service must be comparable to that paid for similar service in the
nearest urban area with more than 50,000 residents, within the state in
which the rural health care provider is located. Rural health care providers will receive support for both distance-based charges and a
toll-free connection to an Internet service provider. Each health care
provider that lacks toll-free access to an Internet service provider may
receive the lesser of the following: (1) 30 hours of Internet access at
local calling rates per month; or (2) $180 per month in toll charge
credits for connecting to the Internet.
In light of concerns about affordability, the FCC agreed with the
Joint Board not to raise the monthly subscriber line charge 125 for primary, residential, and single-line business lines to compensate for the
125.

See infra Part II.
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increased universal service financial burden. Additionally, the Commission endorsed the Joint Board's conclusion that a mechanism used
to balance carrier common line charges among ILECs carriers is an
implicit support mechanism and must be removed from CCL charges.
G. Infrastructure Sharing
Section 259 of the 1996 Act requires ILECs to share "public
switched network infrastructure, technology, information, and telecommunications facilities and functions" with "qualifying carriers"
entitled to receive federal universal service financial support.126 This
section even applies to those lacking economies of scale or scope that
would make it possible for such carriers to provide advanced telecommunications and information services in the most efficient manner
possible. The Act provides certain carriers with a means for tapping
the economies of scale and scope possessed by ILECs, but only for
purposes of achieving a universal service commitment and not to enhance one carrier's competitive prospects over another carrier. Unlike
the general interconnection requirements of sections 251 and 252,
section 259 permits access under particular circumstances where the
carrier accessing ILEC facilities is not a direct competitor.1 27 Such a
scenario typically would involve an independent, rural-based carrier
that could use nearby facilities of a Bell Operating Company while
providing advanced telecommunication services. "Section 259 complements section 254 [universal service] by requiring incumbent LECs
to make available, under certain conditions, public switched network
infrastructure and other capabilities to qualifying carriers that provide
universal service outside incumbent LEC's telephone exchange
128
area."
In implementing Section 259, the FCC emphasized the use of negotiations between carriers rather than a Commission-managed process. Because the carriers will not directly compete with each other, the
Commission concluded that the carrier providing infrastructure access
would have no incentive to raise the cost of network elements for the
sake of a competitive advantage. 129 The FCC will expect ILECs to
provide access to any facility regardless of whether they provide inter126. 47 U.S.C. § 259 (1996).
127. Id.
128. Implementation of Infrastructure Sharing Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report and Order, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 96-237, F.C.C. 97-36, 1997 WL 49598
(F.C.C.) 9 3 (Feb. 7, 1997).
129. Id. 918.
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state services. However, the Commission does not expect ILECs "to
develop, purchase, or install network infrastructure, technology, and
telecommunications facilities and functions solely on the basis of a request from a qualifying carrier to share such elements when such
ILEC has not otherwise built or acquired, and does not intend to build
or acquire, such elements." 130 Likewise, the FCC will permit an infrastructure providing ILEC to withdraw from a sharing agreement upon
demonstrating that the arrangement has become economically unreasonable or is otherwise not in the public interest.
H. Access Charge Reform

The third major prong of the FCC's implementation of the 1996
Act involves reforming the charges imposed on IXCs accessing LEC
facilities to originate and terminate long distance telecommunications.
In view of the cost reductions imposed by the 1996 Act on interconnection charges between ILECs and market entrants and the impending entry by the BOCs into interexchange services, the FCC also had
to consider the even greater disparity in access charges imposed by
LECs on IXCs.13 1 The technological nature of interconnection is quite
similar for access among LECs and between an IXC and a LEC. Accordingly, absent compelling public interest justifications, such as an
130. Id. 12.
131. The FCC stated:
Current access charges distort competition in the markets for local exchange access. Our access charge rules create incentives for IXCs to bypass the LEC
switched access network for reasons that have nothing to do with the economics
of operating an access network. This uneconomic [sic] bypass may occur for a variety of reasons; rates may be too high, or our access charge rules may require
rates for a LEC access service to be too high in relation to the rates for an alternative LEC service or for a comparable service offered by an alternative supplier.
Inefficient entry may occur if the price for a package of jointly-provided services
is above economic cost, even if the LEC would actually be the most efficient provider of the service. Conversely, if a package of jointly-provided services, including access, is priced too low because of regulatory requirements, efficient entry by
an otherwise efficient provider may be precluded. In either case, the total cost of
telecommunications service will not be as low as it could be if all services were
priced at economic levels, thereby providing accurate price signals to all market
participants. High access charges may also keep long-distance rates higher than
they would otherwise be, which restricts demand for service and harms longdistance consumers. We describe more fully some of the causes of uneconomic
bypass below.
Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review, Transport Rate Structure and
Pricing, Usage'of the Public Switched Network by Information Service and Internet Access
Providers, F.C.C. Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 96-263, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. 96-488
42, 1996 WL 733469
(F.C.C.) (Dec. 24, 1996).
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explicit requirement that IXCs primarily underwrite universal service
funding, the charges incurred for local and interexchange carriers
should be similar.
In late 1996, the FCC contemporaneously initiated two proceedings to consider reforms to the access charge regime: 1) a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking seeking to reform the access charge system in
view of the 1996 Act and with an eye toward fostering efficiency; and
2) a Notice of Inquiry on Internet and interstate information services
seeking to identify what policies would best facilitate the development
of the high-bandwidth data networks, while preserving efficient incentives for investment and innovation in the underlying voice net132
work.
I.

Access Charge NPRM

The FCC commenced a review of its Part 69 interstate access
charge rules, together with its Part 61 price cap rules:
to determine the extent to which we must revise these rules to take
account of the local competition and Bell entry provisions of the
1996 Act and state actions to open local networks to competition; to
reflect the effects of potential and actual competition on incumbent
LECs' pricing for interstate access; to implement the 1996 Act's direction to end implicit universal service subsidies in favor of a system
of explicit subsidies; and to establish fair rules of competition for
both the local exchange and interexchange markets, especially as
carriers begin to offer service packages that bundle local and inter1 33
exchange offerings.
The Commission noted that the current access charge system imposes traffic-sensitive, per minute carrier common line ("CCL") fees,
which compensate LECs for the shortfall resulting from less than fully
compensatory flat-rated Subscriber Line Charges, 134 viz., monthly ac132. Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review, Transport Rate Structure
and Pricing, Usage of the Public Switched Network by Information Service and Internet
Access Providers, F.C.C. Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 96-263, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. 96-488, 1996 WL 733469
(F.C.C.) (1996) [hereinafter Access Charge NPRM].

133. Id. 15.
134. "[I]n the original Access Charge Order, the Commission found that recovering
NTS [non-traffic sensitive] costs through flat monthly charges imposed on end users by incumbent LECs would promote optimal utilization of telecommunications facilities." 93
F.C.C.2d at 279. The Commission decided at that time, however, to place a limit on the
Subscriber Line Charge ("SLC"), and, consequently, required incumbent LECs to recover
the remainder of their common line costs through per-minute CCL rates. Id.
The current CCL charge has been uniformly criticized by both incumbent LECs and
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cess payments by end users, even though local loop costs do not vary
with the amount of traffic carried by the loop. 135 Likewise, the Commission's access charge rules required IXCs to pay per-minute charges
for local switching, even though a portion of such costs correlated to
the number of lines connected to the switch, rather than to the number of minutes of traffic routed by the switch. The Commission's access charge rules also imposed a non-facilities-based, per-minute
transport interconnection charge (TIC) on all switched access customers regardless of whether they used the incumbent LEC's transport
36
facilities.'
The Commission concluded that "[riather than fostering efficient
pricing and competition, these mandatory rate structures inflate usage
charges and reduce charges for connection to the network, in essence
overcharging high-volume end users in order to reduce rates for lowvolume end users., 137 The current access charge rules place:
the incumbent LEC at a regulatory agency-imposed disadvantage in
competing for high-volume end users, and jeopardizes the source of
revenue that permits the incumbent LEC to cover its costs of providing service to low-volume end users. At the same time, these inefficient rate structures and implicit support flows also create artificial
impediments to any new entrants that might seek to serve the subsidized end users, because they must attempt to do so without the
benefit of a subsidy. As a result, these access rate structures may inhibit the development of competition for service to low-volume end
users.

138

In the sections that comprise the Third Report and Order in the
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, the FCC
eliminated the lower service band indices, which it considered unnecessarily restricting the ability of LECs, subject to price cap regulation,
IXCs because it discourages efficient use of the network and encourages uneconomic by-

pass." Access Charge Reform NPRM, supra note 132, 58.
135. The FCC tentatively concluded that
several provisions in Part 69 of our rules compel incumbent LECs to impose
charges for access services in a manner that does not accurately reflect the way
those LECs incur the costs of providing those services. For example, generally the
costs associated with the local loop are non-traffic-sensitive (NTS), but our rules
require incumbent LECs to recover a portion of those costs through per-minute
CCL charges. Similarly, at least some portion of the costs of local switching is
NTS, but our rules require incumbent LECs to recover all local switching costs
through per-minute charges.
Access Charge Reform NPRM, supra note 132, 1 55.
136. Id. 17.
137. Id.
138. Id. 8.
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to lower their access prices.1 39 In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
the Commission outlined two possible approaches "for addressing
claims that existing access charge levels are excessive, for establishing
a transition to access charges that more closely reflect economic costs,
and for deregulating incumbent LEC exchange access services as
competition develops in the local exchange and exchange access market.

14 0

Under a market-based incremental approach, the FCC would
"rely on potential and actual competition from new facilities-based
providers and entrants purchasing unbundled elements to drive prices
for interstate access services toward economic cost. ' 141 The Commission would gradually relax and ultimately remove existing Part 69 rate
structure requirements and Part 61 restrictions on rate level changes
as marketplace forces support self-regulation. 142 The FCC's incremental approach would require an ILEC to demonstrate that certain
circumstances exist before the Commission would permit greater access pricing flexibility.143 The incremental approach has two phases.
During the first phase, where partial deregulation can occur, an ILEC
would have to show that its local market has been opened to competition. An ILEC would also have to show potential rivals are able to enter through any of the three avenues mandated by the 1996 Act: interconnection, unbundled network elements, or resale. In the second
phase, full deregulation of price cap and local access tariff filings can
occur if the ILEC proves that it is subject to substantial competi144
tion.
The FCC also identified an alternative to market-based incrementalism: a prescriptive approach to access reform, whereby the FCC
139. The FCC stated that:
[u]nder our existing rules a price cap LEC must specifically justify a proposal to
lower its access charges below the pricing floors established by the indices. Thus,
our rules currently discourage price cap LECs from lowering prices even when it
would be economically efficient to do so. These rules also hamper a price cap
LEC in responding to lower-priced access service offerings by competing access
service providers. To encourage the development and prompt deployment of new
switched access services, we also streamline the process for price cap LECs to offer such services.
Id. 12.
140. Id. 14.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. 'I 15.
144.

Id.
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"would specify the nature and timing of the changes to the existing
rate levels."14 5 Under such a prescriptive approach, the FCC would
compensate for the inability of marketplace forces to drive access
rates to forward-looking economic costs. 146 Under this approach, the
Commission asked for comment on whether it should require ILECs
to move prices for interstate access in their service areas to more economically-efficient levels based on rules adopted in this proceeding,
rather than simply on the basis of marketplace conditions. 147 As with a
market-based approach, the FCC proposed to remove ILEC access
services subject to substantial competition from price cap and tariff
1 48
regulation.
The FCC also sought comment on whether a combination of
these approaches should be used or if one approach was preferable to
the other.149 To the extent that implementation of access charge reform is expected to cause a significant reduction in ILEC access revenues from current levels, the Commission also sought comment on
whether such carriers are entitled, or should be permitted, to recover
some or all of that difference through a temporary special recovery
mechanism.15 0
Both the FCC and the Federal State Joint Board examining universal service funding recognized the economic -inefficiency of a
mechanism that only partially recovers non-traffic sensitive costs
through a fixed charge. 151 The Joint Board suggested that the Commission change the existing rate structure so that ILECs are no longer
required to recover any of the NTS cost of the local loop from IXCs
on a per-minute basis as had been done through Carrier Common
Line charges.152 The Commission considered the Joint Board's recommendation that LECs recoup the costs not recovered from end user
monthly payments (i.e., Subscriber Line Charges) through a flat, perline charge paid by IXCs on the basis of subscribers' Primary Interexchange Carrier selection (i.e., the choice of long distance carrier to

145.

Id. 1 14.

146. Id. 116.
147. Id. 1 16, 17.
148. Id.
149. Id.

16.
17.

150. Id.

18.

151. See Joint Board Recommended Decision, supra note 102, 1 775.

152. Id.

1!9971

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Acr OF 1996

provide direct dialed 1+ and 0+ dialing). 15 3 The FCC also proposed to
increase or eliminate the cap on Subscriber Line Charges for the second and any additional lines for residential customers and for all lines
utilized for multi-line business customers so that such services bear the
1 54
full per-line loop costs assigned to the interstate jurisdiction.
As to local switching costs, the FCC noted that while section
69.106 of its rules required ILECs to charge per-minute rates for local
switching, 55 a significant portion of local switching costs, like line
cards or line-side ports, appeared to vary with the number of loops
connected to the switch and not traffic volume. The Commission tentatively concluded that LECs should recover dedicated line card costs
through flat charges, 156 but refrained from concluding that other
switching functions, like call setup (the process of establishing a
transmission path over which a phone call will be routed) should be
charged on a flat-rated basis even if LECs provide this service on a
157
shared basis to multiple IXCs.
The FCC's Access Charge Reform NPRM also considered transport services, the use of LEC facilities to deliver traffic from LEC
switching facilities to IXCs' switching and routing facilities commonly
referred to as Points of Presence ("POP"). 5 The Modification of Final Judgment required the spun-off BOCs to provide transport services on an "equal charge per unit of traffic" basis, ostensibly to prevent discrimination between AT&T and other IXCs that never had a
corporate affiliation with the BOCs. 15 9 The FCC 'equired ILECs to
establish flat rates for: (1) "entrance facilities," transport service from
the IXC POP to the LECs' switching facility commonly referred to as
the Serving Wire Center ("SWC"), and (2) "direct-trunked transport,"
dedicated line transport service from a SWC to an end office (the
LEC's switching facility closest to the call originator or recipient)
without routing through other LEC switching facilities, typically ones
located higher up in the hierarchy of call switching and routing facilities, commonly referred to as tandem switches.1 60 In addition, ILECs
153. Access Charge Reform NPRM, supra note 132, 1 60.
154. Id.
155. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.106 (1997).
156. Access Charge Reform NPRM, supranote 132, 9[72.
157. Id. 75.
158. Id. 80.
159. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 233-34 (D.D.C.
1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
160. See Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, F.C.C. Dkt. No. 91-213, Report and Or-
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were directed to establish usage-based charges for "tandem-switched
transport," a transport service from the SWC to the end office that
provides switching via a tandem switch. The tandem-switched transport service charge includes an inter-office transmission charge, and a
charge for using the tandem switch.161 Because of the rate averaging
requirement in the MFJ, the FCC authorized LECs to establish a noncost-based transport interconnection charge ("TIC"), to recover the
revenue difference between what the LECs would have realized under
based on
the equal charge rate structure and what they would realize
1 62
used.
facilities
switching
of
types
actual routing and the
The FCC subsequently required ILECs to offer two pricing options for tandem-switched transport service: either usage-sensitive
rates with any mileage component computed on the basis of the distance between the SWC and the end office, regardless of the actual
physical routing; or flat-rated direct-trunked transport between the
SWC and the tandem office and usage-sensitive tandem-switched
transport between the tandem office and the end office, with any tandem-switched transport mileage component computed on the basis of
163
the distance between the tandem office and the end office.

The Access Charge Reform NPRM proposed to divide transport
into three components: (1) charges for entrance facilities; (2) charges
for direct-trunked transport service (transport without intermediate
tandem switching); and (3) charges for tandem-switched transport
service.
The Commission proposed flat-rated charges for entrance facilities and direct-trunked transport service, because it tentatively concluded that "these facilities appear to be dedicated to individual customers, and we believe that flat rates reflect the way incumbent LECs
der and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7006, 7009-10 (1992)
[hereinafter FirstTransportOrder].
161. Id. at 7010.
162. See id. at 7038. The TIC is a non-facilities-based, usage-sensitive charge that currently accounts for some 70% of incumbent LEC transport revenues. In Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 87 F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals directed the FCC to eliminate the TIC, or to provide a reasoned explanation for retention of
this non-cost-based rate element. Id. at 532. The TIC is sometimes referred to as the Residual Interconnection Charge (RIC) or Residual Charge, because it was initially priced on
a residual basis.
163. First Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,8 F.C.C.R. 5370, 5372
(1993). See also Third Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,10 F.C.C.R.
3030, 3036 and 3037, Figure 2 (1997); 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.111, 69.112 (1997); First Transport
Order,7 F.C.C.R. at 7009 n.7, 7077, diagram 3.
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incur costs for dedicated facilities.'' For tandem switched transport,
the Commission proposed several options: (1) retention of the two
existing options discussed above; (2) revert back to the Commission's
initial view that LECs should assess flat-rated charges for the circuit
between the SWC and the tandem, which typically is a dedicated circuit, and to apply usage-based rates for the tandem-to-end office link;
or (3) develop a peak load pricing system. 165
J.

NOI on Internet Access and Service Providers

On the subject of Internet Service Providers and other "enhanced
service providers," the Commission noted that it had previously exempted such ventures from paying access charges in addition to their
ordinary line rental fees. 166 In 1983, the FCC classified enhanced
service providers as "end users" rather than "carriers" for purposes of
167
the access charge rules.
The Commission tentatively concluded that information service
providers should not be subject to access charges.168 Instead, enhanced

and Internet service providers should only have to pay "business line
rates and the appropriate subscriber line charge, rather than interstate
access rates." 169 However, the Commission noted that as "usage con-

164. FirstMemorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,8 F.C.C.R. at 5386.
165. Id. at 5387-90.
166. In 1983 the FCC adopted
a comprehensive 'access charge' plan for the recovery by local exchange carriers
(LECs) of the costs associated with the origination and termination of interstate
calls. [citing MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983)] ... At the time we adopted the original access
charge plan, however, we concluded that the immediate application of [this] plan
to certain providers of interstate services might unduly burden their operations
and cause disruptions in providing service to the public. Therefore, we granted
temporary exemptions from payment of access charges to certain classes of exchange access users, including enhanced service providers.
Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 4305 (1987) (proposing to impose access
charges on enhanced service lines), terminated, 3 F.C.C.R. 2631, 2631 (1988) (proposal
abandoned on ground that despite the apparent discrimination in charges, "a period of
change and uncertainty" besetting the enhanced services industry justified ongoing exemption from access charge payments). Currently the FCC requires users of ISDN services
to pay only one Subscriber Line Charge, an access payment, despite the fact that ISDN circuits can derive more than one voice-grade equivalent channel.
167. Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. at 4305.
168. Access ChargeReform NPRM, supra note 132, 1 283.
169. Id. 285.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 20:11

tinues to grow, such services may have an increasingly significant ef170
fect on the public switched network.'
Now, the Commission felt it was best to consider the issue
broadly rather than narrowly when determining how to "provide incentives for investment and innovation in the underlying networks
that support the Internet and other information services,"' 171 rather
than deciding whether enhanced and Internet service providers should
pay access charges. 72 The Commission noted:
the development of the Internet and other information services raise
many critical questions that go beyond the interstate access charge
system that is the subject of this proceeding. Ultimately, these questions concern no less than the future of the public switched telephone network in a world of digitalization and growing importance
of data technologies. Our existing rules have been designed for traditional circuit-switched voice networks, and thus may hinder the
development of emerging packet-switched data networks. To avoid
this result, we must identify what FCC policies would best facilitate
the development of the high-bandwidth data networks of the future,
while preserving efficient incentives for investment and innovation
in the underlying voice network. In particular, better empirical data
173
are needed before we can make informed judgments in this area.
The Commissions' concerns are valid, given the switch congestion
caused by residential users' connections which employ incumbent
74
LEC switching facilities designed for circuit-switched voice calls.'
The FCC initiated a Notice of Inquiry seeking general comments
concerning the implications of information services such as Internet
access for the telephone network. The FCC also sought comments regarding what should be done to ease the congestion; either through
the development of packet switching hardware able to route data
traffic around incumbent LEC switches, by installing new highbandwidth access technologies such as asymmetric digital subscriber
175
line ("ADSL"), or through development of wireless solutions.

170. Id. I 282.
171. Id. 1283.
172. "The mere fact that providers of information services use incumbent LEC networks to receive calls from their customers does not mean that such providers should be
subject to an interstate regulatory system designed for circuit-switched interexchange voice
telephony." Id. 1 288.
173. Id. 1311.
174. Id. , 313.
175. Id.
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K. Access Charge Report and Order

In May 1997, the FCC's Access Charge Reform Report and Order ("Report and Order")' 76 largely implemented what the Commission had previously proposed. The Report and Order adopts several
reforms to the existing rate structure for interstate access that collectively reduce the cost differential between what IXCs pay for local exchange access and what similarly situated LECs pay. To move closer
to parity of charges, the Commission had to revamp the IXC access
charge rate structure, eliminating implicit subsidies for universal service and other public policy initiatives and identifying explicit subsidy
elements that IXCs should incur. Toward that end, the FCC adopted
changes to the Common Line and Local Switching rate elements proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM"). The Commission generally removed minute-of-use access charges that are not
incurred on a usage-sensitive, per-minute-of-use, basis. The Commission concluded that LECs should recover such non-traffic sensitive
costs through flat-rated charges.
The Commission also adopted changes included in the NPRM regarding the rate structure for interstate transport. The reforms are
designed to move the charges for those services to more cost-based
levels and to promote competition for interstate transport services.
Additionally, the Report and Order affirms the tentative conclusion
reached in the NPRM, that ILECs may not assess interstate access
charges on information service providers. The Commission found that
its existing policy promotes the development of the information services industry, advances the goals of the 1996 Act, and creates significant benefits for the economy and the American people. The Commission said it will address fundamental questions about ISP usage of
the public switched network as part of a broader set of issues under
review in a related Notice of Inquiry.
With respect to the actual rates at which LECs should set access
charges, the FCC rejected proposals for the immediate application of
TSLRIC to each rate element. Instead, the Commission chose to rely
on the NPRM's marketplace option, to drive interstate access prices
toward competitive levels. The Commission believes that this process
will give carriers progressively greater flexibility in setting rates as
competition develops; gradually replacing regulation with competition
176. Access Charge Reform, Report and Order,F.C.C. 97-158 (May 16, 1997); on recon., 12 F.C.C.R. 10119 (1997), Second Order on Reconsideration and Memorandum
Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 97-368 1997 WL 622043 (F.C.C.) (Oct. 9, 1997). See also 12
F.C.C.R. 10175 (1997) (denying motion for stay).
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as the primary means of setting prices and facilitating investment decisions. However, in the absence of competitive self-regulation, the
Commission adopted a prescriptive safeguard that would bring access
rates to competitive levels even in the absence of competition. For all
services still subject to price caps and not deregulated in response to
competition, the Commission will require ILECs subject to price caps
to file TSLRIC studies no later than February 8, 2001. Because competition, forward looking costs and other access charge reforms may
"strand" preexisting ILEC investments, the Commission stated that it
would address in a subsequent order "historical cost" recovery issues
including whether, and to what extent, ILECs carriers should receive
compensation for the recovery of such previously incurred, and now
unrecoverable costs.
L.

Short-term Beneficiaries of the Legislation

Short term beneficiaries of the 1996 Act primarily enjoy an immediate opportunity to reduce a cost of production (such as interconnection and access charge payments), or to reduce the extent to which
they have to reduce production costs of a competitor (e.g., litigating or
seeking arbitration), resulting in the use of a lower state utility commission determined resale discount and interconnection cost than
FCC-generated proxy rates. While the 1996 Act has the potential for
generating more substantial marketplace impacts in the future, real
and significant opportunities already have begun to appear.
M. Media Brokers, Bankers and Transactional Lawyers

By far, the greatest short term beneficiaries of the 1996 Act have
little, if anything, to do with local or long distance telephony. 177 Instead, broadcast media brokers, bankers and attorneys handling such
transactions have accrued the most immediate positive dividends; resulting from their involvement in the proliferation of mergers and ac177. Analyses in the general circulation press of the 1996 Act's one year anniversary
generally note a negative or neutral impact:
To consumers, who were promised more choices, new services and lower prices as
a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the sweeping measure must seem
like a case of legislative bait-and-switch. A year after Congress enacted the landmark law to open the nation's heavily regulated telephone and television industries to greater competition, long-distance telephone rates have risen, cable TV
rates have remained high and little or no local telephone competition has
emerged in most residential markets.
Pradnya Joshi & Elizabeth Sanger, Telecom Reform: Big Talk, Little Action NEWSDAY,
Feb. 4, 1997, at A39. See also Mike Mills & Paul Farhi, This is the Free Market? The Telecommunications Act So Far: HigherPrices, Few Benefits, WASH. POsT, Jan. 19, 1997, at HI.
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quisitions triggered by the 1996 Act. In 1996, the total market value of
terrestrial broadcast, cable and satellite television and radio sales
amounted to $80.1 billion, which was a 74 percent increase over
1995.178 Section 202 of the amended Communications Act of 1934 di-

rected the FCC to revise Section 73.3555 of its Rules179 to permit a
single entity to own or control an unlimited number of television and
radio stations nationwide, with television station ownership subject to
a cap of 35 percent of the nationwide market penetration, and ownership of radio stations in an individual market subject to a numerical
cap based on the total number of stations in the market. The 1996 Act
has enabled broadcasters to cluster ownership in particular markets
with an eye toward accruing economies of scale, such as the use of a
single advertising sales force for several stations.
N. Cable Television Operators
Cable television operators collectively appear to benefit from the
1996 Act which allows greater freedom to raise rates. All forms of rate
regulation ended immediately upon enactment for small systems, and
all but basic-service tier rate regulation will sunset on March 31, 1999,
for larger systems with earlier deregulation available in locales facing
effective competition. However, the market entry of direct broadcast
satellite systems may blunt some of the upward pressure on cable
television rates, despite the freedom to raise rates.
0. 1996 Act Implementers and Interpreters
The 1996 Act does anything but deregulate in the short term. The
Act has or will require the Commission to initiate over 80 proceedings, and presents a justification for an increased budget. Likewise, the
1996 Act's support for federalism and the role of states in setting
rates, interconnection terms and conditions, and new universal service
funding rules creates similar upward budgetary pressure for state
regulatory authorities. Lawyers and consultants have seemingly endless opportunities to offer diverging interpretations of the law and to
180
dispute the FCC's implementation in court.

178. Tim Jones, New Deal in Media: One AM for an FM; With Rules Loosened, More
Stations Traded, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1997, at 1. See also Neil Hickey, So Big: The Telecommunications Act at Year One, 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 5, 23 (1997) (providing a
report on, and analysis of, the major media mergers and acquisitions of 1996).
179. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1997).
180. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (granting temporary restraining order on implementation of provision in the 1996
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Competitive Local Exchange and Wireless Carriers

Almost overnight certain carriers experienced a double digit reduction in interconnection costs, which is a significant cost component."'1 The 1996 Act requires reciprocal charges for terminating traffic generated by another carrier. 8 2 This provision presents the
possibility of zero cost, "sender keep all" termination charges, particularly when traffic volumes reach near parity between an incumbent

carrier and market entrant.'83 At the very least wireline market entrants and wireless carriers no longer will face a scenario where they
must compensate the incumbent wireline carrier for call terminations,
but receive nothing for terminating traffic originating on the incumbent carrier's wireline network.
The FCC's controversial economic analysis of incumbent carriers'
infrastructure investment also provides near term opportunities for
cost savings and perhaps even opportunities to arbitrage the difference between discounted access to unbundled local exchange service
elements and the complete or retail versions. As directed by the 1996
Act, 184 the FCC used a "forward-looking" analysis of ILEC costs when
determining the appropriate cost of access.185 To determine the apAct commonly referred to as the Communications Decency Act that restricts transmission
of obscene or indecent materials via information services like the Internet), affd, Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 1997 WL 348012 (June 26, 1997).
181. For example, "the long-distance companies currently pay 37 cents of each longdistance dollar to the local telephone companies for access to local networks." Michael A.
Noll, The Effectiveness of Long-Distance Competition Who Really Benefits; Industry Trend
or Event, 31 TELECOMM. POL. 28 (Mar. 1997).
182. Section 251(b)(5) states that "Each telecommunications carrier has the duty to:
establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (1996).
183. The 1996 Act directs state regulatory commissions to examine the reasonableness
of reciprocal compensation arrangements and to ensure the "mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier's
network facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other carrier [with a
determination, of] ... such costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls." 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii)(1996). In evaluating the costs of such switching and routing the FCC provided the states with three options:
1) set rates on the basis of total element long-run incremental cost; 2) apply an FCCcalculated range of rates; or 3) permit a "bill and keep," "sender keep all" system. See Local Competition First Order,supra note 22, 1 71.
184. Sections 252(d)(1)(A)-(B) of the 1996 Act, requires interconnection and network
element charges to be just and reasonable, cost-based, nondiscriminatory and inclusive of a
reasonable profit. 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(d)(1)(A)-(B)(1996).
185. ILECs can recover "forward-looking economic cost.., based on the most efficient
technology deployed in the incumbent LEC's current wire center locations." Local Corn-
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propriate discount for resale of local exchange services, the'Commission applied an "avoided cost"1'86 methodology making it possible for
effective competition without the time and investment occurring when
the competitor must undertake some degree of facilities investment.
Q. Explicitly Identified Universal Service Beneficiaries

The 1996 Act codifies a universal service mission, requires the establishment of an explicit subsidy mechanism, and identifies categories of telecommunication users entitled to discounted access to both
Plain Old Telephone Service ("POTS") and advanced services, commonly referred to as Pretty Advanced New Stuff ("PANS") that carriers might otherwise make available initially in urban or high-income
locales. While society as a whole may benefit from this initiative, the
direct and near immediate beneficiaries are: libraries, schools, clinics,
hospitals, and insular or rural residents seeking access to leading edge
services.
R. Internet and Enhanced Service Providers

The 1996 Act contains a requirement that all telecommunications
carriers bear a fair burden in underwriting a bolstered universal service mission. 187 Internet service providers and other enhanced service
providers potentially can migrate significant traffic volumes that otherwise would be subject to a universal service subsidy requirement,
i.e., the Carrier Common Line payment of interexchange carriers. For
example, the use of the Internet to send an e-mail message in lieu of a
facsimile transmission, or the use of the Internet for telephony in lieu
of the dial-up, public-switched telephone network, means fewer metered minutes are generated that trigger a subsidy for lifeline assistance to individuals with low incomes and telephone companies serving high cost regions.
In 1996 the FCC opted to ignore the potential of the Internet and
enhanced services to substitute for basic interexchange services subject to access charges and universal service subsidy requirements.
petition FirstReport and Order,supra note 22, 1 685.
186. Reseller access to wholesale prices will be determined by state regulatory commissions "on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers . . .excluding the portion
thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be
avoided by the local exchange carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (1996).
187. "All providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and
nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service."
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(4) (1996).
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Until the Commission reinterprets the 1996 Act's definition of telecommunications carrier to include Internet-mediated telephony188 and
other services, Internet and enhanced service providers will accrue a
substantial and immediate financial windfall.
S.

State Public Utility Commissions

The 1996 Act set out a blueprint for shared telecommunications
policy-making among the states and the FCC. While allowing public
utility commissions with the resources and inclination to determine
state-specific interconnection and reseller discount rates, the 1996 Act
also appeared to make it clear that the FCC could provide pricing
proxies and other economic and regulatory models for states unable
or unwilling to establish their own. To avoid pricing and policy
"balkanization" of key procompetitive objectives, the 1996 Act appeared to favor FCC leadership, by allowing the Commission to establish federal-state Joint Boards to generate formal advice to the
FCC, and generally work collaboratively with state public utility
commissions.
In the face of sweeping rejection of such shared and collaborative
policymaking, at least as to many key local competition rules set by
the Eighth Circuit,189 the state commissions, by choice or by judicial
decree, have won the right to dominate the process. However, this endorsement of federalism may have the unintended consequence of
delaying the onset of local exchange competition with some states
possibly disinclined to stimulate competition with the kind of "fire
sale" reseller discounts and aggressive forward-looking pricing models
crafted at the FCC.
T. Longer-Term Winners

Collectively, the longer term beneficiaries are most likely to accrue cost savings, generate operating efficiencies, serve new markets
or bundle a larger collection of services. The authors of the 1996 Act
contemplated increased resale and facilities-based competition resulting from the dismantling of legal and regulatory barriers to market entry. An equally possible long term outcome, however, may be mar188. For an analysis of the regulatory, policy, and business implications of using the
Internet for telephone services, see Robert M. Frieden, Dialingfor Dollars: Should the
FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47 (1997).
189. Iowa Utils. Bd., v. FCC, 1997 WL 403401, slip op. at 12 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997)
(No. 96-3321) (finding the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in establishing pricing rules for
local exchange access, including resale discounts and unbundling of network elements).
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ketplace rewards accruing to deep-pocketed players who can afford to
enter new markets and package a winning blend of one-stop shopping
opportunities and cost savings.
U. Incumbents Get Bigger

Rather than having generated a substantially more competitive
marketplace replete with many more players, the 1996 Act appears to
have favored incumbents notwithstanding favorable interconnection
terms and conditions for market entrants. Incumbents, like the Bell
Operating Companies and the three major IXCs (AT&T, MCI and
Sprint) are best able to generate internally or externally the funds
necessary to upgrade existing infrastructures to exploit new market
entry opportunities. Some of these companies, for example Sprint with
the investment of Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, already
have begun to bolster the marketplace prospects by securing additional capital from foreign companies to reach the needed scale.
As to broadcasting incumbents, the 1996 Act contained language
requiring television station operators to pay for new spectrum earmarked for high definition television but possibly used for multiple
services.190 Current political compromises point to a free loan of UHIF
spectrum for HDTV broadcasts, making it possible for broadcasters to
adapt to an age of digital high definition television perhaps coupled
with other multi-media, Internet-based services.
If size matters even more so in the future, then small and medium
sized ventures perceiving an inability to reach the needed size nevertheless will enjoy a possibly large windfall for selling out to someone
that can. If such market consolidation occurs, nearly all independent
telephone companies and second-tier cable television ventures and
wireless operators are candidates for a sell out.
II
Exploiters of Regulation-Created Market
Niches and Competitive Opportunities
The 1996 Act presents incumbents and newcomers alike with
strategic opportunities to exploit regulation-created market niche opportunities. Quite possibly, IXCs will achieve cost of access parity with
190. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 336(e)(2)(A)-(C) (1996) (requiring the recovery for the public a
portion of the value of spectrum allocated for advanced television services but also for
commercial services at a rate commensurate with what competitive bidding would generate).
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LECs in view of the fact that local and interexchange carrier interconnections are physically alike and typically generate the same costs.
Should such parity not result, one can anticipate a plethora of new
LECs appearing on the landscape to qualify for access to unbundled
network elements and lower interconnection charges.
Possibly, a new market opportunity will exist in the video program distribution marketplace through LEC-provided Open Video
Systems, a hybrid of private and common carriage. 91 A programming
entrepreneur, at least in concept, could secure access to channel capacity in a telephone company operated cable television delivery
service without having to secure a municipal franchise, or be bound to
traditional regulatory and franchise responsibilities.
A. Content Creators

If we accept the view that incumbents or others ultimately will invest in a broadband infrastructure, then it follows that demand will increase for content to travel through the larger channel capacity. On a
per minute basis, content typically exceeds the switching and transport
costs, and an upturn in demand probably will maintain this comparative cost differential.
B.

Short-Term Losers

The 1996 Act has generated an immediate impact on the strategic
plans of operators. This impact is the result of legislation's creation of
opportunities for entry into desirable markets, some perhaps more attractive than ones already penetrated. For example, the 1996 Act creates a blueprint for the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs)
to enter the two remaining lines of business, inter-LATA long distance and equipment manufacturing, prohibited by the Modification
of Final Judgment that governed AT&T's divestiture. All the RBOCs
191. See 47 U.S.C. § 571(a)(3)(B)(4). An open video system operator's certification
request must state that the applicant has complied with the FCC's regulations implementing the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 573(b) that: 1) prohibit the operator from discriminating among video programmers regarding carriage on its system; 2) require the operator to
establish rates, terms and conditions of carriage that are just, reasonable and not unjustly
discriminatory; 3) prohibit the operator or its affiliate, if carriage demand exceeds capacity,
from selecting the video programming on more than one-third of its activated channels; 4)
permit the operator to use channel sharing arrangements that provide subscribers with
ready and immediate access to programming; 5) extend the Commission's sports exclusivity, network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity regulations to open video systems;
and 6) prohibit the operator from unreasonably discriminating in favor of its affiliates with
regard to information provided to subscribers for the purpose of selecting programming.
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will pursue these two market opportunities, and at least some will reduce investments and efforts directed at other markets now perceived
to be comparatively less attractive.
It appears that in the short term, the RBOCs have cooled their
zeal to exploit video program production and distribution opportunities. Several RBOCs have downsized their funding of production enterprises recently heralded as proof of the RBOCs' commitment to
generating video service competition. Some RBOCs have not acted on
options to invest in, or to acquire Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Systems-omni-directional microwave systems commonly referred to as wireless cable. The allure of long distance telephone markets made accessible by the 1996 Act appears to have prompted some
of the RBOCs to shift investment emphasis away from video pursuits.
C. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers

The local competition interconnection pricing structure required
by the 1996 Act all but requires ILECs to lose market share immediately. This may constitute a small price to pay for the RBOCs to be
certified as having satisfied the 14 point competitive check that serves
as a precondition to having authority to provide inter-LATA long distance service and to manufacture equipment. On the other hand, discounted resale opportunities and access to ILEC facilities, based on
optimized pricing assumptions rather than actual carrier investment,
guarantees that ILECs will lose both residential and business subscribers. Several ILECs have challenged the Commission's interpretation and implementation of the 1996 Act regarding LEC interconnection. But even with refinement from a court reversal and remand, the
FCC's orders on LEC interconnection and reforming parallel access
charges for rates imposed on IXCs will result in diminished revenues
from core business.
D. Rights of Way Holders
At a time when demand is rising for access to rights of way, poles,
and conduits, the 1996 Act diminishes leverage enjoyed by owners of
such assets. The 1996 Act requires the FCC to establish procedures for
nondiscriminatory access by cable television systems and telecommunications carriers to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned by
utilities or LECs. This means that holders of such valuable assets cannot conduct private auctions or maximize revenues with exclusive or
preferential arrangements.
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Consumers

The drafters of the 1996 Act touted the legislation as a major enhancement of consumer welfare. Most consumers have not experienced any short term gain in terms of a proliferation of services or
downward rate pressure. If anything, local and "retail" long-distance
rates have inched up in the last two years. The 1996 Act imposes
greater penalties on IXCs who change user selection of preferred
long-distance carriers without authorization, a process known as
"slamming." So far, the FCC, with rare exception, has not severely
penalized such behavior.
F.

Long-Term Losers

In the longer term, incumbent telecommunications players should
continue to consolidate their market share in core areas while selectively exploiting market entry opportunities. While ILECs have temporarily abandoned or downsized efforts to capture market share in
video production and distribution, the longer term prospects seem
likely to be that they will renew such efforts to the detriment of cable
television operators. The major longer-term losers appear to be enterprises that have exploited captive or non-competitive markets without
taking adequate steps to establish a superior product or service, despite the likely prospects for future competition. For example, the Big
Three IXCs may face declining margins as a result of BOC entry into
inter-LATA long distance markets, particularly if such entrants refuse
to go along with the incumbents' predilection for limited competition
and conscious parallel pricing. Likewise, if an Internet access or service provider has done nothing but exploit an exemption from having
to pay access charges, a future universal service or access payment will
raise the provider's cost of doing business at a time when other ventures may offer a better, value added service.
III
Conclusion
The future is hard to predict in an environment as volatile and
uncertain as telecommunications and information processing. However, considering the 1996 Act in its most positive light, the big future
losers will be enterprises that have exploited legal and regulatory barriers to competition, and have not vigorously responded to changed
circumstances and the prospects for new facilities-based and resale
competition. The winners will have exploited market entry opportunities, or successfully pursued litigation and arbitration to thwart, stall

1997]

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1996

57

and mitigate the financial consequences of market entry and heightened competition.

